Responsibility: An Effort at Clarification by Halper, Thomas
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
12-1-1978
Responsibility: An Effort at Clarification
Thomas Halper
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Halper, Responsibility: An Effort at Clarification, 12 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 7 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol12/iss1/2
"RESPONSIBILITY": AN EFFORT AT
CLARIFICATION
by Thomas Ha/per*
"What is happening to morality today?" a sophisticated political ob-
server was asked smugly not long ago.
"It threatens to engulf us," he replied.1
In an age dominated by such issues as civil rights, Vietnam, Water-
gate, international terrorism, and the welfare state, who can doubt it?
Self-appointed guardians of civic virtue burst forth like so many owls
chasing mice; politicians, in the manner of germs fleeing a clot of peni-
cillin, scramble to distance themselves from the "mess in Washington";
the public is said to have grown cynical about it all; and pundits treat
this "loss of faith" in government as if it were a plague of atheism strik-
ing medieval Rome.
Sooner or later, amidst the thunder and babble, one hears the word,
"responsibility." It is the touchstone of the debate. Everyone, it seems,
is for it. Or at least says that he is.2 Nor is this refrain all that new:
"There is no danger in power," cautioned one Professor Woodrow Wil-
son, "if only it be not irresponsible."3 Modern academics would surely
concur: a distinguished European political scientist termed responsibil-
ity "the cardinal issue of democracy"4 and a well known American an-
alyst of public administration called it "the very crux of the
* A.B., 1963 (St. Lawrence University); M.A., 1967 (Vanderbilt University); Ph. D.,
1970 (Vanderbilt University). Chairman, Department of Political Science, Baruch College,
City University of New York.
1. Bickel, quoted in Polsby, In Praise of 41exander M Bickel, COMMENTARY, January
1976, at 50, 52.
2. Even Cosmopolitan magazine's famous Cosmopolitan Girl soliloquized, "What's the
very best thing a man can be if he really loves a woman? Responsible! That may sound a
little unsexy but believe me it can be quite a turn-on!" N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1976, at 68, col.
1.
3. Wilson, The Study ofAdministration, 2 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 197, 213 (1887), reprintedin
56 POLITICAL Sci. Q. 481, 497 (1941).
4. Finer, Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government, 1 PuB. AD. REv. 335
(1941). In this paper, I follow Schumpeter's generally accepted view of democracy as an
institutionalized system compelling would-be leaders to compete for the electorate's vote
and featuring broad civil liberties. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DE-
MOCRACY 269-83 (3d ed. 1950).
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maintenance of the democratic system."5
Yet oddly enough, there is no agreement on what "responsibility"
means. Is its character mainly legal? Bureaucratic? Political? Profes-
sional? A combination of all these?' Dizzy with confusion, the reader
is left asking, with Alice, whether you can make words mean so many
different things. Evidently, most analysts would agree with Humpty
Dumpty's riposte, "[t]he question is. . .which is to be the master -
that's all."7 This is not really a bad answer as much as an inadequate
one, for by now the need is less for creativity than for criticism -
hence, this exercise in clarification, which proceeds by considering the
senses in which "responsibility" is normally used.
I. DESCRIPTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
"Responsibility" in its plainest sense describes a condition. An offi-
cial is responsible for a particular event or policy, which is to say, had
he not acted as he did, the event or policy would have occurred in a
substantially different fashion.8
The careful reader, noting the use of "significantly" and "substan-
tially" in an exercise in clarification, may desire greater precision. In
our personal lives, he admits, such terms provoke no problems. We see
spouses "significantly" affecting one another and parents "signifi-
cantly" affecting their children, and only a pedant would demand cali-
bration of the effects. But our public life is different. Officials are
ordinarily enmeshed in large organizations which help to define the
individual's "public reality," identify his problems, propose solutions
for his consideration, monitor his ongoing programs, evaluate his past
5. Levitan, The Responsibility of 4dministrative Officials in a Democratic Society, 61 PO-
LIlICAL SCI. Q. 561, 566 (1946). See also, e.g., J. MILLETr, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AD-
MINISTRATION 465 (1959); F. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 7 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Odegard, Toward a Responsible Bureaucracy, 292 ANNALS 18, 19 (1954).
7. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 247 (New York 1928) (1st ed.
London 1866).
8. Even this principle, it must be conceded, would not cover all situations. If two or more
causes concur to bring about an event, but either one of them operating alone would have
been sufficient to cause the result, the test breaks down. If the Senate and House, for exam-
ple, were simultaneously to defeat a bill, we could not absolve each of responsibility merely
because the other's action would by itself have proved decisive. On the contrary, we would
assume that both chambers were equally and fully responsible because a defeat in either
would in itself have proved fatal to the bill. Similarly, if a man were to bleed to death from
substantial wounds inflicted by different persons acting independently, the "law does not
measure the effects of the several injuries in order to determine which is the more serious
and which contributed in the greater measure to bring about the death," but imputes the loss
of life to both. State v. Luster, 178 S.C. 199, 208, 182 S.E. 427, 431 (1935); State v. Francis,
152 S.C. 17, 60, 149 S.E. 348, 364 (1929).
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actions, and so on. So great is his dependence on the organization for
information, ideas, and authority that, as an individual, it often seems
that he is rarely critically important, even if holding office at the higher
levels. In the age of the bureaucracy, to put this view baldly, organiza-
tion is almost everything. Thus, a bureaucracy may "significantly"
contribute to the occurrence of a given event or policy, though acts with
such "significance" could reasonably be attributed only to a few of its
personnel. Cumulatively, the personnel are important; individually,
they are not. Granting this and recognizing the normal habit of obedi-
ence, we must be parsimonious in the use of "responsibility" as descrip-
tive of an individual's acts, reserving it for a relatively small number of
cases. Moreover, the emphasis on an actor's not merely contributing to
an event, but rather signjfcantly contributing to it, is required if we are
to avoid terming everyone-and, thus, as a practical matter, no
one-responsible for everything. Still, replies the careful reader, re-
peating his request like a pesky drunk accosting a barmaid, how signifi-
cant is "significant"? How large must it be? One answer, sadly, would
seem to be that quantification at this very early stage of conceptual
development is simply an unrealistic request.9
But another answer would be that this entire line or argument is mis-
guided, for it begs a question whose lineage is as ancient as it is contro-
versial: is individual voluntary action a significant causal factor? Omar
Khayy'am supplied a famous reply:
Tis all a Checquer-board of Nights and Days
Where Destiny with Men for Pieces plays:
Hither and thither moves, and mates and slays,
And one by one back to the Closet lays.1°
In less mystical terms, Tolstoy in War and Peace argues that human
behavior is governed by the inexorable workings of inscrutable natural
laws operating through causal chains too numerous and complex for
man to fathom. 11 It is only ignorance and vanity, in his view, that de-
lude celebrated men of action and intellectuals into believing them-
selves major historical forces. 2
9. For an even more pessimistic conclusion to a similar problem raised by the concept of
proximate cause in the law of torts, see W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 41, at 236-37 (4th ed.
1971).
10. THE RuBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM stanza XLIX (E. Fitzgerald trans. & ed.
1859)(lst ed. Shiraz 1460).
11. For a searching analysis of Tolstoy's philosophy of history, see I. BERLIN, THE
HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox (1953).
12. Tolstoy, in fact, contends that celebrated men are further removed from occurrences
than ordinary men, whose very nearness gives their actions an impact that the actions of
their superiors lack. 1 L. ToLsToy, WAR AND PEACE 22-30 (L. Weiner trans. 1904)(lst ed.
19781
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Such assertions of the unknowable may seem inadequate as explana-
tions. Yet what social scientist has not from time to time suspected that
many of his data-manipulating colleagues operate from a still cruder
environmental determinism, unleavened even by a humility derived
from having pondered the issue, let alone by any analogue to
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
The undeniable existence of great national heroes, on the other hand,
would seem to challenge this dour determinism by demonstrating that
individuals can in fact make a difference. The very word "greatness,"
in fact, implies significant social impact. Yet, here too, however, the
skeptic has a ready reply, observing that nearly everyone feels a need
for leadership in modem society. Both the public, which desires the
leader's benefits and social achievements, and the leader, who desires
power and glory, have an interest in endowing him with extraordinary
capacities. Modem communications skills and technology accentuate
these tendencies, and no longer is "charisma" reserved for the Weber-
ian individual who appears supernatural or superhuman.13 Leaders try
to take credit for accomplishments while they were in office, sometimes,
like Napoleon or Andrew Jackson, lending their very names to the age;
their foes, naturally, seek to blame them for everything that went
wrong, as poor Herbert Hoover discovered; the public, as a conse-
quence, comes to believe that leaders are in fact decisive. But
"[c]ertitude," as Holmes observed, "is not the test of certainty.' 4 That
we feel that our nominal leaders may dominate events does not make it
so, but may merely attest to the power of public relations and the prev-
alence of a popular will to believe that someone is in charge.'- In the
1869 n.p.). Napoleon's claim to control of events is, therefore, attacked as fallacious, self-
glorifying humbug. Id.
13. See M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 358-59
(1947).
14. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 40 (1918).
15. The easy assumption that all influential men must perforce be great is challenged by
Sidney Hook, who distinguishes between the "eventful man" and the "event-making man."
The former influences subsequent events, though possessing no remarkable qualities, like
the legendary little Dutch boy who put his finger in the hole in the dike and saved the town
from inundation. Any little boy could have, and probably would have, done the same thing.
On the other hand, according to Hook, the event-making man alters developments as a
consequence of his extraordinary abilities, like a Hitler changing the course of world history.
S. HooK, THE HERO IN HISTORY 151-83 (1943). Other tyrants could be enumerated to un-
derline the point, and, even in democracies where leaders are less powerful, it seems hard to
deny that it makes a difference which man is on top. Bernard Brodie, for example, argues
that had Bryan been elected ?resident, the United States probably would not have entered'
World War .B. BRoDm, WAR AND POLrrIcs 362 (1973). Similarly, one may contend that
if McCarthy had been elected President in 1968, the Vietnam War would have ended much
sooner, that if Lincoln had not been assassinated, Reconstruction would have been more
[Vol. 12
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words of the eighteenth century encyclopedist, Holbach:
You will say that I feel free. This is an illusion, which may be compared
to that of the fly in the fable, who, lighting upon the pole of a heavy
carriage, applauded himself for directing its course. Man, who thinks
himself free, is a fly who imagines he has power to move the universe,
while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it.
1 6
Yet this paper rests upon the contrary assumption that, within cer-
tain ordinarily rather narrow limits, individuals can and do exercise
control over their behavior. For we cannot proceed unless we assume,
as Cardozo put it, that "a choice there has been, not a submission to the
degree of Fate; and the considerations and motives determining the
choice, even if often obscure, do not utterly resist analysis."17
The determination of descriptive responsibility, in any case, pivots
upon the effect of the individual's actions. Perhaps he intended to act
as he did or perhaps he was coerced; perhaps he desired to bring about
the consequences that followed or perhaps he did not see them or even
sought to avoid them; perhaps he acted after a critical and knowledge-
successful; and so on. Yet such tantalizing "what if' parlor games suffer from a pair of
serious flaws. First, they masquerade as controlled experiments in which only one variable,
the person of the leader, is changed, when in truth innumerable variables are changed. Had
Bryan been elected, for instance, the American polity would have had to have been vastly
different; had he been in office at the outbreak of the war in Europe, the American polity
would also have been different, as would have been the European perceptions of America.
Thus, even if America had not entered the war, one could not determine to what extent (if at
all) this was due to Bryan's being different from Wilson, Bryan's America being different
from Wilson's, or Bryan's Europe being different from Wilson's. Second, this approach, like
its Tolstoyan opposite, resorts to intriguing examples to distract us from noticing that it
assumes the very conclusion it is supposed to prove. It may, that is, seem obvious that
presidents make a difference, but only if one first posits individual causality. Tolstoy grants
that, as a practical matter, we do posit individual causality, even adding that life otherwise
would be dreadful; but he is properly firm in insisting that our belief is quite irrelevant to the
solution of the problem. After all, our confidence in individual causality may itself be pre-
determined.
16. Quoted in Edwards, Hard and Soft Determinism, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 120
(S. Hook ed. 1961).
17. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1921). Cf. S. HODGSON,
THE METAPHYSIC OF EXPERIENCE 120 (1898) ("[W]ithout real freedom of choice there could
be no real moral responsibility; and the sense of it, if it were still felt, would have, like the
sense of freedom, to be classed as an illusion"). But see also J. EDWARDS, FREEDOM OF THE
WILL (P. Ramsey ed. 1957) (1st ed. 1754 n.p.); D. HuME, An Inquiry Concerning the Human
Understanding, in ESSAYS AND TREATISES § VIII (1871), reprinted in D. HUME, AN INQUIRY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1955); C. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS 236-73 (1957);
C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944).
Following Pascal who argued that one ought to believe in God because he has nothing to
lose if he is wrong and much to gain if he is right, I contend that one must accept substantial
individual choice as a working principle. For if this assumption be correct, the work based
upon it will gain in accuracy and importance, and if the assumption be incorrect, it can do
no harm, since everything was predetermined, anyway.
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able scrutiny of goals pursued and means selected or perhaps he acted
impetuously or ignorantly. None of these factors affects the individ-
ual's descripion as responsible for significantly contributing to a partic-
ular event or policy.18
II. JUDGMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
Motivation and intention may be irrelevant to a discussion of de-
scriptive responsibility, but it is hard to believe that they are trivial
matters. Clearly, they seem to be important, but in what way? The
answer is that they help us to determine if we feel that we can justifi-
ably hold a man responsible for his actions, which is to say, we approve
or disapprove of the way he acted and perhaps reward or punish him as
appropriate. Although often posed within a political, administrative,
or some other ostensibly "practical" amoral context, the question raised
is fundamentally ethical in nature: did the official act as he should
have, and, if not, were circumstances present which absolve him of
blame?19
Consider an official who failed to tell the proper authorities of cor-
rupt behavior on the part of a subordinate.20 Is this failure blamewor-
thy? Obviously, we might offer one answer if he chose to remain silent
and another if he chose to inform but became paralyzed in an auto
crash and was thereby physically prevented from executing his choice.
In the latter case, his failure would be involuntary, and would free him
from culpability. In the former case, we must probe more deeply
before satisfying ourselves as to his responsibility.
For suppose, in the first place, that the official's decision to be silent
rested on his ignorance of his subordinate's unlawful behavior.21 Here,
18. The common law in its earliest days adopted such a view, making "men answer for all
the ills ot'an obvious kind that their deeds bring upon their fellows," irrespective of intent. 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 470 (2d ed. 1899). One
modem scholar has argued for a return to this approach. "A crime," he maintains, "is an
act. It is not an act plus an intent. 'Injure actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea' is no longer
true. The modem maxim should be that most ancient one: Actus facit reum." Vevitt, Extent
and Function of the Doctrine of the Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. RaV. 578, 589 (1923).
19. We put aside here Mine. de Staels contention, "Tout comprendre 'est tout pardon-
ner." A. DE STAP-L, CoRINNE, XVIII, ch. 5 (H. Nicolle ed. 1807).
20. This illustration may perhaps bring to mind the Watergate affair, in which President
Nixon claimed ignorance of his subordinates' unlawful behavior, while his opponents re-
plied that such ignorance derived largely from a failure to investigate suspicious actions
vigorously and a desire to use lack of knowledge as an exculpatory explanation in the event
of a possible future expos6.
21. The official could, or course, have accused his subordiate of misconduct, while he (the
official) was ignorant of such misconduct, but such an accusation would have constituted
lying, for it would have involved the official's falsely presenting allegations as if he knew
[Vol. 12
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we can distinguish ignorance which defied the official's reasonable ef-
forts to overcome from ignorance based on inattention and disinterest.
Even more clearly, such ignorance can be distinguished from ignorance
based on the declaration, "Do what you wish but just don't tell me
about it." Or suppose that the official's ignorance was not of the facts,
but of the law. The general legal rule is that ignorance of fact excuses
but that ignorance of law does not. Yet, surely, we could distinguish an
official's ignorance of a law which, after reasonable and good faith ef-
forts he found vague, ambiguous, contradictory, and subject to various
interpretations by experts, from ignorance based on simple incompe-
tence or on a willful refusal to search out the law for fear of what might
be found.22
Suppose, in the second place, that the official's decision to remain
silent was motivated by a desire to protect his family from harm plausi-
bly threatened by the subordinate. If we grant the common sense view
that one's obligation ought to diminish as the risk and difficulty of per-
forming a task increase, we are led to the conclusion that there can be
no duty to be a hero. The official's decision to remain silent to protect
his family, therefore, would obviously differ from one that was moti-
vated by a desire for material gain, such as if the subordinate had paid
the official to keep him quiet. In both cases, the official intended to
remain silent; his failure to inform could be excused neither as involun-
tary nor as ignorant. But if the intentions as to the means were alike,
the intentions as to the ends were sufficiently different to lead us to
deny responsibility to the official in the former case and attribute it in
the latter.
It would seem, in any event, that judgmental responsibility is limited
by the settled Kantian maxim that "ought implies can." Neither law
nor morality can require the impossible. Thus, we do not blame the
official for his silence when due to paralysis involuntarily caused and
continued, or due to lack of knowledge despite his efforts to inform
himself; we do not blame a speechless man for not speaking or an igno-
rant man for not telling us what he does not know.
As a matter of common practice, however, the apparently self-evi-
dent validity of the maxim has undergone considerable modification.
them to be accurate. Although the allegations may have turned out to be accurate, the act of
lying would not, ag a result of such luck, have become morally equivalent to telling the truth
deliberately.
22. For an interesting and sustained attacked on vagueness in legal terminology, see 0.
JENSEN, THE NATURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT (1957). But cf Halper, Logic in Judicial
Reasoning, 44 IND. L.J. 33, 46-48 (1968) (proposing that ordinary standards of vagueness
and clarity may not be appropriate in evaluating legal language).
1978]
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Individuals seeking to avoid responsibility need not claim that such re-
sponsibility entails actions on their part which are literally impossible;
they may merely claim that such actions impose an unreasonable bur-
den. Thus, we excuse the ignorant official in our example because he
had made a reasonable effort to inform himself as to his subordinate's
behavior; we do not require, as a condition of exculpation, that he had
devoted himself fanatically to the cause, utilizing all available govern-
mental manpower, personal funds, private contacts, and so forth. We
may, in fact, even prefer that he limit his efforts to the reasonable level,
on the ground that monomaniacal devotion to rooting out corruption
within the bureau might leave too few resources to carry out the bu-
reau's tasks within the larger society. In other words, we may view a
certain amount of corruption as one of the costs of doing business, and
not want purity to be maximized at the expense of all other values; by
maximizing purity, the official might be overturning a priority determi-
nation made by his superior'or by the lawmaking body charged with
overseeing the bureau, and this (as we shall see shortly) might involve
him in yet another conflict with "responsibility."
On the other hand, the obligation not to demand the impossible of
the citizen might be rejected because to hold the citizen to a lesser stan-
dard might entail demanding the impossible from the lawmaker: a le-
gal system of perfect clarity and inviolate consistency. Not
surprisingly, in the conflict of competing demands, those in authority
have usually decided that the hardships should fall elsewhere. And yet,
the problems they confront are obviously real ones. Statutes drawn
with rigorous precision, for example, might minimize uncertainty in the
short run, but, by becoming quickly obsolete, promote it in the long
run; for changing times and conditions may upset unrecognized or
unarticulated assumptions with a ruthless suddenness. Moreover, dem-
ocratic legislating, founded on bargaining and compromise and often
dominated by personal and partisan considerations, is itself inimical to
high standards of statutory definiteness. Thus, citizens find themselves
subject to such vague phrases as "due process of law" or "reasonable
care," whose amoeboid contours may render them, from the point of
view of textual analysis, practically useless as guides to individual re-
sponsibility and official actions.13 Finally, considering legal systems in
their entireties, officials and citizens invariably find themselves subject
23. Circularity may compound the problem, as in the case of "reasonable care" which is
defined essentially as the care a reasonable man would exercise, while "reasonable man" is




to a number of contradictory commands. The Constitution, for exam-
ple, clearly guarantees freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial,
but offers no hint that the two may conflict, and so, utterly fails to indi-
cate which principle should supersede the other. Such incompatibility
may be partly a function of sloppy rulemaking, and yet some internal
conflict, despite the legislators' and administrators' best efforts, may be
irremediable. This at least is the clear implication of G6del's Theorem,
which states that the consistency of a logico-mathematical system can
never be satisfactorily proven by resort to the methods of the system
itself.2 4 P.W. Bridgman, a Nobel laureate in physics, has generalized
from this that "whenever we have, a system dealing with itself we may
expect to encounter maladjustments and infelicities, if not downright
paradox. '2 5 Regardless of the rulemakers' preoccupation with symme-
try and elegantiajuris, therefore, some incompatibilities will surely per-
sist like ice patches in an Arctic spring.
Candor, in any event, compels us to admit that we deal with the
problem of requiring the impossible through a series of fictions and a
policy of selective enforcement. The ideal citizen, we pretend, is obli-
gated not only to obey the law but also to discover what it is, and so if
he pleads ignorance we ordinarily brush that assertion aside. We do
this despite our appreciation of the enormous subtlety and complexity
of the law, and even when the citizen is poorly educated and of low
intelligence. And we do this not because we are seduced by the fiction
of the ideal citizen, but instead because we believe that expediency re-
quires us to sacrifice the individual's interest in favor of the commu-
nity's interest.26 We often demand the impossible from him, and hope
that he does not complain. By the same token, in the law of torts, we
determine liability in accordance with the behavior of a fictional "rea-
sonable man," taking "no account of the infinite varieties of tempera-
ment, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a
given act so different in different men."' 7 Again, we do not seriously
24. F. WAISMANN, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL THINKING 101 (1951).
25. P. BRIDGMAN, THE WAY THINGS ARE 7 (1961).
26. Specific rationales differ. A founder of the positivist school of jurisprudence, for ex-
ample, felt that ignorance of the law, if accepted as an excuse, would always be alleged,
thereby involving the courts in insoluable and interminable questions. I J. AUSTIN, LEC-
TURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 482 (London 1885). Holmes, on the other hand, argued that
accepting ignorance as an excuse would encourage such ignorance. 0. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAW 41 (M. Howe ed. 1963). And a modem legal philosopher, for his part, contended
that accepting ignorance would contradict the basic postulate of a legal order, Ze., that the
law is what officials and not private persons determine it to be. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 376-83 (2d ed. 1960).
27. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 86 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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believe that everyone can meet the "reasonable man" standard, but
merely that the adoption of such a flexible, objective, external model is
preferable to the chaos of attempting to formulate standards for indi-
viduals on a case-by-case basis.2 8
Viewing judgmental responsibility in such mundane terms, however,
may produce the unintended effect of trivializing the matter. As an
antidote, consider the profound judgmental issue raised by the famous
1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann, one of the chief Nazi officials in charge
of the slaughter of European Jewry. Then and now, much of the philo-
sophical controversy clustered around an unusually provocative book
written by a renowned political thinker: Echmann in Jerusalem a Re-
port on the Banality of Evil by Hannah Arendt. Herself a Jew, Ar-
endt sees Eichmann less as an anti-Semitic incarnation of evil than as
an idealistic bureaucrat dedicated to the performance of his task, a kind
of individual common enough under any system to be properly termed
banal.
The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him,
and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and
still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal
institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was
much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied
, * * that this new type of criminal... commits his crimes under circum-
stances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that
he is doing wrong.29
The obligation to obey superiors' orders and the feeling of being a cog
in a vast machine were, in Arendt's view, therefore, sufficient to over-
come any scruples regarding the Final Solution in those rare Nazis in
whom such scruples were present. This, in an extreme form, Arendt
seems to be saying, illustrates how far subjective evaluations of judg-
mental responsibility may diverge from objective evaluations (or at
least from someone else's subjective evaluations).
Yet there is something preposterous about treating Eichmann as
28. It is worth adding that just as the law may sometimes demand the impossible, so, too,
a defendant cannot count on impossibility as a defense. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Peters [1951]
S. Austl. St. R. 54, where defendant was convicted of attempting to bet on a horse race in
violation of law, despite the fact that the horse had been scratched an hour before the bet
was placed. Nor is it unknown for men to lose paternity suits, despite blood test results that
demonstrate irrefutably that they could not have fathered the child in question, as in the
famous lawsuit involving Charles Chaplin and Joan Barry. Compare N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1944, at 19, col. 6 (reporting result of blood test showing Chaplin could not have been the
father) with N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1945, at 25, col. 4 (reporting a California jury's declaration
that Chaplin was, nonetheless, the father).




merely the "normal," "banal" bureaucrat, for his job was not compil-
ing motor vehicle registrations or supervising income tax audits, but
handling the logistics for an unprecedented mass murder. Bureaucrats,
after all, are human beings, too: is it a sign simply of "normal banality"
to join such an extraordinarily vicious organization as the Nazi party
and to dedicate oneself to expediting a policy so uniquely heinous that
contemporaries often found it literally incredible? Would a "normal,"
"banal" bureaucrat perceive no ethical distinction worth noting be-
tween carrying on routine administrative functions and sending mil-
lions of persons to their deaths? As one venerable student of the
Holocaust put it: "In the Nazi universe the monstrous had become ac-
ceptable, the extraordinary, ordinary. Evil was not committed by com-
monplace robots; rather evildoers had become commonplace. The
lesson of the Nazi era is not the banality of evil but that inordinate evil,
if licensed, can become banal."3 In order to believe that Eichmann
did not act from evil motives and intentions, it is necessary to believe,
with Socrates, that no one deliberately does evil. For plainly Eichmann
acted knowingly, willfully, and voluntarily, with respect to seeking his
position and carrying out its awful work. He could plead neither igno-
rance nor mistake, nor coercion, insanity, or self-defense. If an unam-
biguous moral judgment as to Eichmann's responsibility is impossible,
then no such judgment is possible, and the entire subject exists only at
such a rarefied incorporeal level that it never intrudes into the hard
earth of reality.
Yet moral fault and responsibility are not an inseparable pair. As
the law of torts developed in England, for example, the principle was
that, "In all civil acts, the law doth not so much regard the intent of the
actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering." 31 Aiming at pre-
serving the peace by providing an alternative to private vengeance,32
the law was directed at practical and not ethical ends. Gradually, the
task of preserving public order was imposed on other governmental
units-principally the police-and the practice of holding blameless
persons legally liable came under increasing criticism by those con-
tending that there should be no liability without fault.33 But these crit-
30. Syrkin, Book Review, NEw REPUBLIC, May 17, 1975, at 27. Cf. L. LANGER, THE
HOLOCAUST AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1975) (where it is argued that the unique-
ness of atrocity lies in its routinization of horror, in which no act is forbidden to those in
control merely on grounds of pain or evil).
31. Lambert v. Bessey, 88 Eng. Rep. 220, 221, T. Raym 421, 422 (K.B. 1681).
32. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 2, 3 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
33. Id. at 144-63; Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggest Changes in Class/cation
(pts. 1-3) 30 HARv. L. REv. 241, 319, 409 (1917).
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ics never succeeded in overthrowing the doctrine of strict
liability-liability, that is, without fault-which has been used to hold
many careful, reasonable persons legally blameworthy. As before, the
rationales are apt to be heavily practical. An individual (A) involved in
abnormally dangerous activities, for instance, may be held liable for
damages caused, even if he acted in an entirely reasonable way.
Clearly, or so the rationale goes, someone should be compelled to aid
the poor victim, and+ Ais the obvious choice. For he voluntarily under-
took the risky activity for personal gain, and thus should assume the
burden if something goes wrong; further, he can probably bear the loss
more easily than can the victim.34 Thus, our refusal to assign moral
fault to A may often coexist with our judgment that he must take on the
responsibility.
Thus far, we have used "judgmental responsibility" solely in the ret-
rospective sense as a judgment made on past actions. But judgmental
responsibility can also be prospective, and can be concerned with how
officials ought to behave in the future. Lacking the rich factual context
of the past, prospective rules are frequently too vague, overly abstract,
or difficult to apply. Still, their importance as guides to action can
hardly be disputed, and most laws, regulations, professional duties, and
personal norms fall within the category of prospective rules. A statute
prescribes that an official must make certain determinations of fact
before proceeding with a certain course of action; custom and tradition
prescribe that an official will in good faith seek to implement the poli-
cies of his politically appointed superiors; an official's own views of
himself in his professional role and as a moral agent ordinarily pre-
scribe that he not use his discretion to ignore an able subordinate in
order to assign an important matter to a ne'er-do-well brother-in-law
newly employed by the organization. Whether retrospective or pro-
spective, however, the essence of the notion of judgmental responsibil-
ity remains the same: the determination of the justifiability of holding a
man answerable for his actions. In this, however, the assumption that
descriptive responsibility is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite of
judgmental responsibility is sometimes stretched nearly to its breaking
point.
III. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
The notion that a society, or at least a very large portion of it, could
be held responsible for specific actions of some of its members is at
34. This, of course, is the rationale for workmen's compensation laws.
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least as ancient as the days of the Old Testament, when God punished
the Egyptians' first born for the sins of the Pharaoh.3 ' The practice of
assigning such responsibility, however, is by no means dead. In mod-
em America, for example, after virtually every shocking and painful
political event, self-proclaimed custodians of public morality declare
that "the nation. . . bears . . . a burden of guilt," for "the evil is in
us," presumably due to "a sickness weakening our stature before the
world" or to "[slomething in the air of the modern world ....
Even Watergate, we are straightfacedly told, "happened not because a
handful of politicians were unprincipled, but because we, as a people,
are not being true to the principles we profess. 37 Accusatory and not
confessional, these moral spokesmen -use "we" to mean "you," as if
haranguing a Sunday school class on the evils of tardiness, and we rec-
ognize that their denunciation is uttered as much to establish their in-
nocence as our guilt. But inasmuch as judgmental responsibility entails
descriptive responsibility, we, the nonassassins and nonplotters, are at
least entitled to ask how we properly can be blamed. The acts pro-
ceeded wholly without our knowledge or consent, and typically, in fact,
against our most strongly held desires; the assertions that we as individ-
uals significantly contributed to the events are entirely unsupported.
Lacking responsibility, we are admonished to assume guilt; meanwhile,
the guilty, for their part, often seem eager to avoid responsibility.
Suppose, however, that the actions had been done in our name.
Would that make us responsible? That such a unilateral declaration by
someone else could be held binding on us immediately strikes us as
35. Exodus 11-4-8. In addition to a mutual moral responsibility, which obliged all Jews to
keep their fellows from performing misdeeds, all Jews were held ethically, materially, and
legally responsible for the transgressions of any individual Jew. The most important collec-
tive responsibility, however, was evidenced at the giving of the law at Sinai, in which the
children of Israel were all depicted as in God's debt. Id at 24:3-8.
36. Remarks, respectively, of Senator Eugene McCarthy, Professor Arthur M. Schles-
inger, Jr., Archbishop Terence J. Cooke, and columnist James Reston, following Senator
Robert Kennedy's assassination. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1968, at 23, col. 2, 32, col. 4, 24, col. 7,
20, col. 7. Similar pronouncements had followed President Kennedy's assassination. See,
e.g., remarks of James Reston, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1963, at 1, col. 5; civil rights leader
James Farmer, id. at 8, col. 6; Senator J. William Fulbright, id Dec. 6, 1963, at 18, col. 8;
psychiatrist Karl A. Menninger, id. at 18, col. 3; Times editorial, id. Nov. 28, 1963, at 38, col.
1 (Editorial).
37. Nimmo, On Politics in Post- Watergate America, MADEMOISELLE, May 1974, at 38.
Similarly, the journalist author of a much-praised book on Vietnam concluded that the
war's great lesson was "to teach you that you were as responsible for everything you saw as
for what you did." M. HERR, DISPATCHES (1977). The logical next step, of course, is this
declaration from mass murderer Charles Manson: "I am what you have made of me and the
mad dog devil killer fiend leper is a reflection of your society." Manson, quoted in V. BTjG-
LIOSI & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER 415 (1974).
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absurd.38 What is needed, plainly, is our informed consent. But con-
sent to what? To the legitimacy of the system? To the legitimacy of the
actors? To the legitimacy of the actions?
Common speech exacerbates the problem. For like a deserted picnic
ground carpeted with discarded paper plates, our talk is littered with
errors of reification. Thus, a recent newspaper carried such headlines
as, "Rent Board Lowers Ceilings for Raises on Leases for Year," and
"I. L. 0. Refuses to Censure Israel. 's9 Reacting against this kind of
practice, E. H. Carr argued that institutions ought not to be evaluated
morally as if they were individuals. Personifying the state, he con-
ceded, is a useful fiction, but the observer must not neglect several cru-
cial distinctions: the state lacks the "intimate emotions which play a
large part in individual morality,"'' the state is expected by the "ordi-
nary man" to engage in "certain kinds of behaviour which he would
definitely regard as immoral in the individual,"' 4' the state has "a right
of self-preservation which overrides moral obligation,"42 and, above
all, international morality presupposes "a society of states" but no such
community exists.
43
Carr's is the classic Machiavellian position and though none of his
contentions is truly persuasive, 44 they have, over the years, acquired a
certain force. The real defect in his argument from a judgmental point
of view, however, is quite serious, for his central assumption is falla-
cious. That assumption plainly is that institutions and individuals are
mutually exclusive categories. On a certain primitive verbal level, this
is accurate enough: when we say that "Rent Board Lowers Ceilings,"
we cannot simultaneously literally be saying that "Members of the
Rent Board Lower Ceilings." But the meaning is clear: when we utter
38. H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 161 (1950).
39. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1978, at Al, col. 6 and at A4, col. 3.
40. E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARs Cassis 149 (1939).
41. Id. at 157.
42. Id. at 159.
43. Id. at 161. Carr's distinction is reflected at law in the general rule that when an indi-
vidual acts in his official capacity, he may not be held personally liable, while when he acts
in his private capacity, he may be held personally liable. This principle, however, has been
modified in practice by such secondary distinctions as discretionary versus ministerial duties
and actions wholly outside the official's jurisdiction versus actions in excess of his authority.
Moreover, war crimes tribunals can hardly avoid punishing officials in their private capaci-
ties, inasmuch as the governments they served frequently no longer exist.
44. Thus: the state may lack "intimate emotions" but the officials who act in its name do
not; the "ordinary man" test of morality is arbitrary and irrelevant; the state's absolute right
of self-preservation is a bald assertion from which many would most vehemently dissent;
and international morality presupposes only multiple actors and not a psychological or orga-
nized community of nations.
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the first sentence, we mean the second. In other words, when we speak
of institutions taking certain actions, assuming certain obligations, or
declaring certain policies, what we really are referring to are institu-
tional personnel acting in their official roles. This fact is often obscured
by bureaucratic impersonality and the anonymity of the actors, by the
great longevity and size of many agencies that seem to eliminate the
influence of individuals, by the common institutional practice of claim-
ing to represent large numbers of persons outside their structures, or by
the legal fiction permitting institutions in certain circumstances to be
treated as persons. But that most officials involved in formulating a
given policy are unknown to the public hardly justifies our conclusion
that the actions were not theirs; that an agency like the Justice Depart-
ment has outlived all its employees does not imply that it and not they
have done its work; that an organization like the Agriculture Depart-
ment declares that it "speaks" for farmers does not mean that the insti-
tution or its asserted clientele have acted and not the Department's
officials; and, on the other hand, that these institutions can sometimes
conveniently be treated as if they were persons certainly does not imply
that they have any separate life of their own, except in a purely meta-
phorical sense. The dichotomy, therefore, is not between institutional
and individual responsibilities, but between official individual and pri-
vate individual responsibilities.
Applying Carr's argument in this context, we see that he feels that
the former kind of responsibility ought to be subject to different - and
lower - moral standards than the latter. Yet the consequences of offi-
cial action are apt to be more significant than the consequences of pri-
vate action. Moral considerations, as a practical matter, therefore,
become in his schema pretty much confined to small things. Social sig-
nificance and moral considerations emerge as inversely related; an indi-
vidual is less subjbct to moral strictures as a Secretary of Defense
contemplating the utility of thermonuclear threats than as a father
grappling with the question of whether he should permit his daughter
to attend an unchaperoned party. It is, thus, as necessary as it is obvi-
ous to recall that institutions as such do not act; individuals, acting in
the institution's name, do.
IV. RELATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although we have been focusing on "responsibility" as a word in
vacuo, this should not obscure the fact that its usage implies the exist-
ence of a relationship. At the simplest level, the relationship may in-
volve only a person and a thing. Thus, in a descriptive sense, we might
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say that a boy who drops an egg is responsible for having broken it.
But in the judgmental sense - and especially when dealing with public
affairs - responsibility normally involves a relationship between peo-
ple: a clerk is responsible to his supervisor for properly processing so-
cial security application forms; an Assistant Secretary is responsible to
the Secretary for gathering information on, say, East Asia; a ward
heeler is responsible to his urban party boss for delivering the vote.
Responsibility, then, can be routine or sophisticated, administrative or
political. In any case, it ordinarily involves a duty owed to a principal
by his agent, and his superior-subordinate relationship, in turn, implies
hierarchy.45 Bureaucratic officials are said to be responsible to their
supervisors, who are responsible to the chief executive, who is responsi-
ble to the people (usually pronounced with a capital "P"). Such a
model preserves the chain of responsibility, but only at the cost of legit-
imizing a naivete that leaves the believer as helpless before reality as a
rube before a carnival barker.
In the first place, there is less to hierarchy than meets the eye. Civil
service has denied the superior much of his control over the hiring and
firing of subordinates; the desirability of administrative experience and
the breadth of bureaucratic concerns has tended to place generalists in
high level positions, where their admitted lack of subject matter exper-
tise has forced them to rely on subordinates for identifying problems or
successes and proposing changes or continuities; the sheer size of mod-
em bureaucracies has left superiors reliant upon subordinates to dis-
cover what is going on within the organization; bureaucratic
subdivisions invariably seek to form alliances with legislators, interest
groups, the press, or other bureaus in order to immunize themselves
against a good deal of their superiors' authority; political control of the
bureaucracy is undermined by the apparently irreversible trend of
45. Two qualifications must be noted. First, in a relatively small number of types of
cases, responsibility may exist not in a superior-subordinate relationship, but rather, in one
between equals, as in marriage, where each spouse is responsible to the other for the per-
formance of certain tasks. The organizational (and, occasionally, marital) problems flowing
from such a lack of hierarchy, however, are apt to be nightmarish - hence, responsibility
normally involves hierarchy. Second, in an informal but nonetheless often potent way, a
reverse superior-subordinate responsibility relationship often emerges. In this situation the
superior is said to be obligated to try to protect or advance the interests of his subordinates.
This function may not seem very salient to him, unless he is afflicted with the paternalism of
noblesse oblige, but it may provide one of the major criteria by which those beneath him
evaluate his performance. Granting the significance of bureaucratic goal displacement, still
this reverse responsibility obviously is meant to be secondary to conventional responsibility,
for an organization is ostensibly created primarily to carry out tasks and not to promote the
welfare of its members.
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granting agencies vast quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers; the
ubiquitous goal displacement phenomenon ensures that bureaucrats
will tend to place their own interests ahead of the formal aims of the
organization; and so on and on. The hierarchical presumption of
subordinate dependence upon superiors, in other words, is substantially
altered in practice.
It is easy to enumerate the arguments in support of tightening hierar-
chical control: it would facilitate democratic accountability to the peo-
ple; it would promote consistency and predictability throughout the
organization; it would place key decisions in the hands of top officials
who could see the "big picture" that subordinates might not notice be-
neath a congeries of routine and minutiae; and it would reduce the
opportunity and temptation for low-level corruption. These are fine
arguments, but they can rarely avoid deflation from the eager pin of
practicality. Thus, stricter hierarchy, it could be retorted, would be in-
tolerably inefficient, too rigid and incapable of adapting to change and
diversity, and helpless to alleviate the numerous inequities that arise in
unforeseen areas. It is almost certain that strict hierarchy could not be
imposed-and if, by chance, it could, it would before long prove so
unworkable that it would be junked with neither ceremony nor regret.
The predilection to cling to the old hierarchical fiction, however, re-
mains, as in the case In re Yamashita," which involved a general who
had been made commander of the Japanese troops in the Philippines
during the final, chaotic stages of World War II. A few days after his
arrival in Manila, American troops invaded the island of Leyte, and
Yamashita withdrew to the mountains, his troops killing about twenty-
five thousand Filipinos in the process. Later, he surrendered and was
charged with failure to control his troops, thereby permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other crimes. Yamashita himself was
never accused of ordering, condoning, participating in, or even know-
ing about the crimes. An American military commission nonetheless
found him guilty, the Supreme Court upheld this decision, and
Yamashita was hanged.47
In the second place, as the Watergate affair made irrefutably clear,
"The halo provided by the status system makes blame increasingly
46. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
47. Yamashita is not unique. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Weiss, 139 Pa. 247, 21 A. 10
(1891), where an employer was held guilty of unlawfully serving oleomargarine in his res-
taurant, although the act took place without his knowledge. Differences in the magnitudes
of the offense charged and punishment inflicted are, of course, immense and obvious.
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difficult as we go up the hierarchy."48 It is no coincidence, therefore,
that Yamashita fought for the losing side; General Curtis LeMay, who
conducted fire-storm raids on Japan at a terrible cost to civilian life,
was subsequently rewarded with command of the entire American Air
Force. It did not even occur to authorities that Yamashita's conviction
for war crimes may have afortiori entailed LeMay's. The prestige of
high office and the substantial reprisal powers attaching to it quite nat-
urally contribute to an attitude which ordinarily assigns responsibility
to top officials only in the case of success; failure is someone else's
fault.
4 9
In the third place, Lincolnesque references to "government by the
people" have polluted ordinary discourse by focusing on an alleged
collective responsibility owed by officials to the people and enforced
through the electoral process. It is easy to push such notions too far.
Even if one postulates a rational and issue-oriented electorate, one is
confronted with rational and intense party leaders and candidates who
will choose to maximize their support through vague and ambiguous
appeals that frustrate the voters' efforts pretty effectively.50 But when
one takes into account that most people neither know nor care much
about politics, and make their electoral decisions for a very wide vari-
ety of reasons (often, nearly issue-free in content), the problem is exac-
erbated. This is not to say, of course, that the electorate is entirely
ineffective in holding officials responsible for their actions. On such
broad issues as peace and prosperity, ordinarily loosely construed,
large portions of the electorate may vote as a means of registering their
retrospective judgments, and issue coherence has become more wide-
spread and more likely to be translated into appropriate voting behav-
ior.5 But party and candidate considerations often outweigh issues in
importance, and the diversity of the voters' issue rationales may make
it impossible to speak accurately of an electorate's issue rationale.
48. V. THOMPSON, MODERN ORGANIZATION 133 (1961).
49. An extreme illustration of this practice, of course, is contained in the biblical story of
Job, for whose many and awful afflictions God was responsible but not blameable. Flaubert
recounted a bizarre and not altogether dissimilar experience he observed in his visit to Egypt
in the 1850's: the Doseh ceremony, in which
a man on horseback rides his mount over the backs of a number of other men stretched
out on the ground like dogs. The celebration is repeated at certain times of the year
• . . in memory and as a perpetuation of the miracle performed by a certain Moslem
saint who rode his horse into Cairo over earthenware jars without breaking them. The
cad who reenacts this ceremony cannot hurt the prostrate men, just as the saint didn't
break the jars. If the men die, it is due to their sins.
G. FLAUBERT, in FLAUBERT IN EGYPT 93 (F. Steegmuller ed. 1972).
50. A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 135-39 (1957).
51. N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 289-306 (1976).
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Thus, even if we avoid the error of reification, and carefully equate the
"people" with a tangible electoral majority, it is difficult to discover a
consistently effective system for enforcing responsibility in which the
"people" play an active and decisive role. Incumbents naturally seek to
avoid responsibility; the electorate is not sufficiently knowledgeable, in-
terested, or united in its goals and values to hold officials rigorously
responsible, and so, the final link in the chain proves dangerously
weak.
52
Yet, though the normal tendency is to mistake surface for substance
and exaggerate the importance of hierarchy, it also would be a mistake
to underestimate its importance. Numerous writers on the presidency,
for example, have repeatedly stressed the office's great power-and not
merely the apocalyptic power to initiate a thermonuclear war. Richard
Neustadt, for instance, while noting that the President's power is less to
command than to persuade, makes it clear that he has a formidable
array of weapons if he is ready and willing to use them.53 Similarly,
while George Reedy elaborates on the theme of ambitious sycophantic
aides isolating the President from reality, the former Johnson press sec-
retary observes that it is the unchecked power of the chief executive to
choose his favorites that produces this condition.54 Nor is hierarchical
power restricted to the President. Clearly, White House assistants like
Bundy and Haldeman, cabinet secretaries like Dulles and Kissinger,
and career bureaucrats like J. Edgar Hoover and Frances Knight were
forces to be reckoned with.55 It may be, as Howard Lentner has sug-
gested, that "it is a malady of our age that the concept of equality has
so taken over our consciousness that we flatten everything out and re-
gard men in production-line terms where each is interchangeable with
every other."56 If so, it is necessary to guard against the tendency to
ignore individual distinctions and to view large organizations as head-
less monsters. Not only might such an approach be misleading, but
52. Other elements such as interest groups, may, as a practical matter, take up the slack in
enforcement caused by the electorate's low level of knowledge, interest, and participation.
53. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 33-107 (1960).
But cf Sperlich, Bargaining and Overload'An Essay on Presidential Power, in PERSPECTIVES
ON THE PRESIDENCY 406-30 (A. Wildavsky ed. 1975) (challenging Neustadt's view that pres-
idential power is less to command than to pursuade).
54. G. REEDY, THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY 88-99 (1970).
55. Yet these may serve as counter-examples, too. For Bundy and Haldeman were more
influential than most cabinet secretaries, Dulles and Kissinger are believed to have been
more potent in foreign policy making and execution than Presidents Eisenhower and Ford,
and Hoover and Knight were so securely ensconced in their agencies that even hostile super-
iors could not affect them much.
56. Letter from Howard Lentner to Thomas Halper (Dec. 26, 1975).
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also the belief in the impossibility of hierarchical responsibility may
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as all concerned expect upper level
officials to be dominated by subordinates and, acting on that premise,
help to bring this condition about.
V. NoRM RESPONSIBILITY
That responsibility most often describes human relationships should
not seduce us into forgetting that individuals may also feel responsible
to deeply held beliefs, values, or rules of conduct. These might be per-
sonal (e.g, honesty) or institutional (e.g, nonpartisanship), but in the
end they usually come down to a matter of conscience. To say this,
however, is not to dismiss the topic with a platitude. For one thing, the
dictates of conscience are not always clear and unambiguous. Personal
and institutional norms may conflict, resulting in wrenching agony for
the individual involved. The protagonist in Herman Wouk's best-sel-
ling Caine Mutiny, for instance, had to choose between the personal
norm of protecting his men and the institutional norm of obeying his
superior - all while on a ship caught in a violent storm at sea. 57 Simi-
larly, in the Pentagon Papers affair, Daniel Ellsberg had to choose be-
tween acting on his personal belief that American involvement in the
Vietnam War ought to be stopped and the Defense Department's norm
of adhering to official regulations, including those governing documen-
tary security classifications.58
Yet though one might be quite confident about the demands of his
own conscience, troubles still persist. Even centuries ago, when the
conscience was regarded as the voice of God, it was evident that differ-
ent men claimed to hear different messages, and that, on a given sub-
ject, most heard none at all. Thus my conscience might oppose yours,
while onlookers might fail to perceive the issue as involving conscience
at all. In today's less pious age, the subjectivity of conscience seems
quite undeniable. Conscience, in fact, may be said to rest upon a self-
evaluation of self-interest: I must do a certain thing because, if I don't,
my guilt will be unbearable. What I cannot bear, however, may not
bother you.
The place of conscience in politics is difficult to treat with confidence.
57. See Halper, The Caine Mutiny Trial- Was It Fair?, in WAS JUSTICE DONE? HISTORIC
TRIALS ON REviEW 23 (F. O'Brien ed. 1971).
58. At bottom, however, this conflict between personal and institutional norms may
merely reflect David Riesman's famous "inner-directed" versus "other-directed" classifica-




Weber understood this in his classic Politics as a Vocation, in which he
distinguished between two kinds of conscience-oriented politicians, one
preoccupied with purity of intent and the other believing that conse-
quences must be considered as well.5 9 We may applaud the latter for
his maturity, but we must also frankly doubt whether he can carry the
vastly more complicated burden he has assumed. In democracies, the
officeholder's responsibility to norms becomes still more confusing. A
legislator, for example, may play a trustee's role,60 deciding, in Burke's
famous words, on the basis of "his unbiased opinion, his mature judg-
ment, his enlightened conscience. '61 Or he may play a delegate's
role,62 in which, as one academic-turned-congressman put it, "the will
of the people should prevail as over against any private prejudice, even
of the Congressman. ' 63 By the same token, in the bureaucratic arena
the traditional preference for a rule of law over a rule of men must be
tempered by the recognition that "[a]dministrative discretion. . . is of
the essence of the modern State." This discretion has spread like ink
in a snifter of cognac, so that a leading authority on administrative law
now estimates that "eighty or ninety percent of the impact of the ad-
ministrative process comes from informal action which is not re-
viewed ... .6 Upper level officials necessarily leave to middle and
lower level subordinates such fundamental decisions as whether in spe-
cific cases any action should be taken at all, and, if so, what kind of
action, and when, and by whom, and with what vigor. It is not the
police commissioner, after all, but the lowly patrolman who determines
whether there is sufficient cause to justify an arrest.66 Institutional
59. M. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 120-
21 (H. Gerth & C. Mills trans. & ed. 1958).
60. See Eulau, The Legislator as Representative: Representational Roles, in THE LEGISLA-
TIVE SYSTEM 267, 272-76 (1962).
61. E. BURKE, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 2 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
EDMUND BURKE 89, 95 (1901).
62. See Eulau, The Legislator as Representative: Representational Roles, in THE LEGISLA-
TIVE SYSTEM 267,276-77 (1962). The distinction between trustee and delegate roles does not
imply that either role is ordinarily followed with great consistency or that other role options
(e.g., partisan, politico) do not also exist. Id. at 277-80.
63. Smith, Should Congress Lead or Follow Public Opinion?, TowN MEETING, July 9,
1942, at 16.
64. Laski, quoted in Dimock, The Rbie ofDiscretion in Modern Administration, in J. GAUS,
L. WHITE, & M. DIMOCK, THE FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 45 (1936). The
intervening four decades have served merely to reinforce the judgment that "informal dis-
cretionary action is the lifeblood of the administrative process." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND GOVERNMENT 217 (2d ed. 1975).
65. Id. at 215.
66. See, ag., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMO-
CRATIC SOCIETY (2d ed. 1975).
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norms as determined by the organizational leadership, therefore, are
constantly being modified or reversed by subordinates acting on the
basis of their own views of institutional norms or even on the basis of
their own personal norms.
By this point, the observer is likely to feel that conscience may be
magnificent in such heroic opponents of tyranny as Thomas More or
Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, but that, in a democracy, it is necessary to
recall the aged maxim, "Virtue itself hath need of limits." For democ-
racy elevates not the moralist or philosopher-king who gives the public
what it ought to want, but the opportunist who, in order to secure or
retain electoral office, gives the public what in fact it does want. Fueled
by self-interest - both of candidates and of voters - democracy has,
with accuracy and not malice, properly (if irreverently) been dubbed
"the rule of the politician."
67
This Schumpeterian insight, however, must coexist with one of the
more maddening of current anomalies - the widespread preoccupa-
tion with public morality coupled with the extreme unfashionableness
of the private sense of guilt. After seemingly interminable years of Vi-
etnam and Watergate, official deceptions and credibility gaps, managed
news and leaked revelations, integrity to many people constitutes the
primary political issue, overwhelming such traditional candidate
qualifications as intelligence, sophistication, experience, and achieve-
ment. Indeed, the 1976 presidential candidacies of Carter, Brown and,
to a lesser degree, Ford and Reagan, appear to have been elaborations
on that very theme.
Yet, in our own private lives, the sense of guilt has come under un-
precedented attack: self-improvement pop psychology dismisses it, the
entertainment media ridicule it, and the "Do it!" counterculture blasts
it. In this Puritan-based nation, those few who admit to experiencing
guilt do so either in terms of the penitent ashamed of his remorse or of
the customer complaining about a defective appliance. So pervasive is
this degrading attitude that even one who bitterly excoriates the cra-
venness of ancient enemies feels compelled to note in passing: "I am
suspicious of guilt in myself and in other people: it is usually a way of
not thinking, or of announcing one's own fine sensibilities the better to
67. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMocRAcY 285 (3d ed. 1950). An
enduring problem of democracy, therefore, is how to meet long-range goals that seem to
require major short-range public sacrifices. The easy answer is "leadership," but with some
reason, the public tends to adhere to Keynes' famous observation that, in the long run, we
are all dead. In a dictatorship, a Stalin seeking to industrialize a Russia need pay such
sentiments little obeisance. But in a democracy where public dissatisfaction translates easily
into votes, officials must proceed with far greater caution.
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get rid of them fast."68 Only the loftiness of its tone sets this declara-
tion apart from coarser denunciations of guilt.
It was not without good cause, therefore, that a cultural critic re-
cently observed:
The only sin today is not having found a therapy that makes us stop feel-
ing bad. Guilt, instead of being a fever that tells us there's something
radically wrong, is a cramp, an involuntary contraction of the muscle or
the brain that keeps us from doing whatever we want to right away ....
Therapists forgive everything, because nothing is a crime; we do not sin,
we dysfunction.69
Guilt, like unhappiness itself, can be alleviated by exhortation or per-
sonality tinkering; Crime and Punishment7" is superseded by I'm
OK-You're OK.7
This soft and comforting message has spread like a civilization-en-
dangering fungus in a horror movie, and clearly is hostile to the very
concept of responsibility to norms. For if this attitude persists, the in-
consistency of such a bifurcated view, in which responsibility becomes
more a concern for the public man as it becomes less a concern for the
private one, cannot avoid undermining the entire idea of responsibility
itself. Assumption of guilt cannot be allocated according to a societal
principle of division of labor, even when those bearing the burden are
self-recruited elected officials.
VI. DETERMINING RESPONSIBILITY
Whether viewed in a descriptive or judgmental sense, responsibility
does not, like a neon sign at an all-night truckstop, unambiguously pro-
claim its own existence. Discussions of responsibility, therefore, cannot
honorably avoid the question: who is to determine who is responsible
for what? The answer, however, would seem merely to be: it depends.
It depends, that is, on what relationship concerns us. And so we are
accustomed to believing that, if it is a political relationship in a democ-
racy, the determination will be made by the electorate or its chosen
officials; if it is a legal relationship, then by the courts; and if an admin-
istrative relationship, then by one's superiors. Leaving aside the ques-
tion of how well such formulae accord with limitations imposed by the
real world, a fundamental problem persists: how can an outsider make
68. L. HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME 42-43 (1976).
69. Leonard, Critic's Notebook An Evening with 2 Walking Anachronisms, N.Y. Times,
May 26, 1976, at 24, col. S. 2-3.
70. F. DosToEvsKII, CRIME AND PuNisHMENT (T. Crowell ed. 1886)(lst ed. 1866 n.p.).
71. T. HARRIS, I'M OK-YoU'RE OK (1969).
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a satisfactory determination of the nature and extent of my responsibil-
ity, when his information as to my intentions, knowledge, and often
even actions is secondhand, and thus, to some degree in error? As Mill
pointed out, "with respect to his own feelings and circumstances the
most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably
surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else."'72 Men defend-
ing decisions made under stress invariably take refuge in this argument,
denying later critics their legitimacy by denying them their jurisdiction.
"How dare they, in a context of peace, comfort, and security, sit in
judgment on how I acted in a context of war! How self-righteous of
them"-- and, more to the point --"how invalid their conclusions must
be!"
Plainly, this is a position of some force, intellectually and emotion-
ally. We recognize that our outsider status makes a substantial amount
- perhaps a decisive amount - of ignorance inescapable, and we
properly shrink from a sanctimonious pose. And yet a flight to the al-
ternative hardly seems satisfactory, either.
That alternative, of course, is internal determination: since only I
have the requisite knowledge of my situation, only I am qualified to sit
in judgment of myself. One difficulty here, of course, is that I have a
vested interest in my absolution, and that, consciously or uncon-
sciously, my judgment may be critically affected by a desire to protect
or further my own ends. Another difficulty is that my knowledge may
in fact be less impressive than I believe, for memories and perceptions
are subject to many distorting influences, even in the most intelligent
and well-intentioned of men. Outsiders, therefore, may be less biased
and perhaps, cumulatively, even more knowledgeable than I, and, thus,
better qualified to determine my responsibility.
Moreover, internal responsibility, by focusing on the individual's
own recognition and acceptance of his obligations, carries with it some
special problems. It is not merely that individuals seem prone to pro-
claim their responsibility for popular occurrences, deny it for unpopu-
lar ones, and speak evasively of it for those in between. Such
individuals, of course, need not be wrong; President Johnson, as he re-
peatedly said, was responsible for the adoption of Medicare. No, the
ambiguity goes deeper; we feel it to be unjust to blame someone for
failing to achieve what he never attempted, and so, ordinarily, we seem
to require some acceptance of responsibility before passing judgment
on his acts. Yet, presumably as a result of our efforts to educate our
72. J. ILL, ON LmERTY 94 (Oxford University Press, World's Classics ed. n.d.) (lst ed.
London 1859).
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children ethically, we feel that requiring this acceptance makes it too
easy for individuals to avoid blame for blameworthy acts.
Furthermore, even the individual's acceptance should not always be
taken at face value. He may, that is, experience a sense of guilt, but it
may be neurotic guilt and not real guilt. Now neurotic guilt, however
infantile and irrational, ordinarily contains a core of truth (e.g., the
guilt may be a reaction to an unexpressed wish that a family member
be killed). A person who experiences guilt, in other words, nearly al-
ways has thought or done something for which he should properly feel
guilty. But the neurotic pretends to himself and to others that there is
no valid reason for his guilt, sometimes misassigning his felt guilt to
some obviously minor or irrelevant act, so that his guilt can be easily
refuted. Thus, an individual may experience guilt and be quite incapa-
ble of discerning which responsibility he has failed to meet.
Neither internally nor externally determined responsibility, viewed
in stark isolation, is adequate. And so we have developed a hybrid,
consisting of external and internal means of determining responsibility.
The external means, which Dah has identified as part of the Madis-
onian tradition,73 have received much public attention in the schools
and the press, and self-designated "realists" are fond of declaring them
the basis of democracy. The American Constitution's labyrinthine sys-
tem of checks and balances, we are told, especially federalism and the
separation of powers, deserves credit for preventing intolerable politi-
cal and administrative abuses, and for preserving American democ-
racy. A brief glance at democracies lacking these devices and at
dictatorships claiming them, however, is enough to decimate our certi-
tude. And when we begin to take account of the enormous importance
of social, economic, and informal political factors, the significance of
statutes and formal political structures seems to recede still further. As
Dahl so succinctly put it:
To assume that this country has remained democratic because of its Con-
stitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more
plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because our soci-
ety is essentially democratic. If the conditions necessary to polyarchy had
not existed, no constitution intended to limit the power of leaders would
have survived.74
This is not to deny that the Constitution promotes democracy, both
through its declaration of principles and creation of structures and
through its symbolic status as legitimizer of the political system and as
73. See generally R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33 (1956).
74. Id. at 143.
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reinforcer of public support. But, it does indicate that the major signifi-
cance of systems of values, cognitions, and symbols, types of family
and peer structures, socialization and responses to authority, and other
social and psychological factors should not be underestimated. Nor, by
the same token, is it necessary to be a Marxist to recognize the powerful
impact upon a political system of the nature, ownership, and manage-
ment of the means of production, distribution, and exchange in a soci-
ety. Similarly, the influential role of such extraconstitutional political
elements as parties and interest groups hardly requires elaboration.75
But suppose we move from the macro level with its broad societal
concerns to the micro level, and focus on the bureaucracy-the context
in which "responsibility" is most likely to be heard. As an organiza-
tional form stressing such external means of control as formal hierar-
chical structure and legal rules of behavior,76 the bureaucracy has
traditionally been staffed in the United States by "a comparatively col-
orless public service. 77 Surely here, if anywhere, responsibility will
largely be externally determined and enforced. And, yet, a closer look
reveals that bureaucratic authority, communication, and jurisdictional
patterns conform only very imperfectly to formal regulations; unavoid-
able and widespread discretion blurs the distinction between adminis-
tration and politics; officials, moreover, are human beings, too, with
ambitions outside their roles which may nonetheless affect the perform-
ance of their tasks, and with the ever present human problems of per-
ception and evaluation. A bureaucracy, in short, comes to resemble a
piece of limburger cheese, whose animal vitality is apparent only under
a microscope, but is no less frenzied for its low visibility. In bureaucra-
cies, as in other settings, internalized norms of obligation, honesty, effi-
ciency, and so on - whether deriving from childhood experiences,
adult peer influences, or some other factor or factors - are crucial in
forming the individual's subjective definition of his "role responsibil-
ity."78 And it is this definition which we must largely credit for confin-
ing the official's actions within generally acceptable limits. External
75. Thus, in the course of cautioning against a "period of reductionism in political sci-
ence," Dahi argues that "two kinds of institutional arrangements seem to have important
consequences for the 'effectiveness' of the government," namely, "strong executives armed
with extensive capacities for action" and a "multiparty system." R. DAHL, POLYARCHY 121-
22 (1971). Clearly, neither the enormous strength of the Presidency nor even the existence of
political parties was anticipated by the Founding Fathers, let alone expressed in the Consti-
tution.
76. M. WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (H. Gerth
& C. Mills trans. & ed. 1958).
77. Dykstra, The Questfor Reiponsibility, 33 AM. POLnmCAL Sci. REv. 1, 13 (1939).
78. H. HART, PuNisHmENT AND REsPoS sBILrry 212-14 (1968). On individual motiva-
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controls, viewed as the primary guarantor of responsibility, therefore,
must fail in a democracy; for there can never be enough bureaucrats to
watch the bureaucrats - or enough to watch the watchers, adinfinitum
- and heavy reliance on external checks quickly breeds inefficiency,
low morale, red tape, and, if taken too far, tyranny. 9
The necessity for official discretion, however, provides the opportu-
nity for official abuse. Thus, while internalized judgments founded on
the individual's conception of his own roles as an official80 and as a
moral agent"1 may sound ephemeral, they are, in reality, vital to the
creation and maintenance of a responsible bureaucracy in a democ-
racy. If such elements are inadequately internalized, no set of external
checks can compensate for their absence; and if such elements are ade-
quately internalized, external checks tend to retreat to a supplementary,
if still important, position. 2 In the last analysis, therefore, it is the
man, rather than merely the rules by which he is governed, to which we
must look for the achievement, retention, and advancement of high
standards of governmental responsibility.8 3 It is he who is the first and
the last defense." In an imperfect world, internalized determination of
responsibility is an imperfect safeguard, but here, as in all other things,
the people must take their chances.
tion as a main determinant of organizational effectiveness, see D. KATz & R. KAHN, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 336-89 (1966).
79. Thus, we see the inadequacy of Mao's famous maxim that "Political power grows out
of the barrel of a gun." MAO TsE-TUNG, Problems of War and Strategy, in QUOTATIONS
FROM CHAIRMAN MAo TsE-TuNG 33 (S. Schram ed. 1967). In a face-to-face encounter,
such a show of force may be effective, but in a societal context, the threat of violence is a
poor substitute for the habit of obedience or even simple approval. Many dictators, further-
more, have found themselves impaled on the horns of a dilemma: they create an army and
police to control the people and find that they themselves cannot control the army and po-
lice.
80. In this regard, Friedrich has emphasized the official's "sense of workmanship or
craftsmanship." Friedrich, The Dilemma ofldministrative Responsibility, in REsPONSmmrrY
189, 191 (C. Friedrich ed. 1960). Gaus has emphasized the "standards and ideals of his
profession." Gaus, The Responsibiliy of Public Administration, in J. GAUS, L. WHrIE & M.
DIMoCK, Tim FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 26, 40 (1936). Levitan has empha-
sized "a high degree of democratic consciousness." Levitan, Political Ends andAdministrative
Means, 3 PuB. AD. Rnv. 353, 357 (1943).
81. From an individual's perspective, these roles may conflict, as the Watergate affair well
illustrates.
82. See also L. HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE
SPIRIT OF LMERTY 155 (3d ed. 1960).
83. The problem takes on a chicken-and-egg character when we note that the society must
rely heavily upon internalized norms and values which themselves are products of socializa-
tion.
84. But see Lentner, The Political Responsibility andAccountability of the United Nations
Secretar.-General, 27 J. POL. 839-60 (1965).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS
"Responsibility" has long done double duty: it describes relation-
ships and prescribes obligations. The two functions have themselves
often been confused with one another. One reason for this is the com-
mon habit of using "is" to mean "ought," but another reason is that
"responsibility" is so closely connected with praise and blame and re-
ward and punishment that it is a standard weapon in political scuffles.
Whatever the cause, the result is a word abused as often as it is used,
and the quality of political discourse has suffered as a consequence.
This paper has represented an effort to begin to dispel the problem
by confronting the term as it is ordinarily applied. In its descriptive
sense, we say that an individual is responsible for a particular event if,
had he not acted as he did, the event would not have taken place in
substantially the way that it did. "Responsibility" is thus solely a func-
tion of the effects of the individual's actions. In an age of bureaucracies
where men work together in large numbers and in complex relation-
ships, the difficulties of establishing the nature and extent of individual
responsibility are great, indeed.
More commonly, "responsibility" is used in a judgmental sense, per-
mitting us to approve or disapprove of one's actions and to treat him
accordingly. Here, considerations must go beyond questions of effect
to those of voluntariness, knowledge of fact and law, and short and
long run intentions. Prospectively or retrospectively, judgmental re-
sponsibility is also difficult to establish, and even such an obvious stan-
dard as "ought implies can" is of less practical value than might be
supposed.
Difficulties in establishing judgmental responsibility may have con-
tributed to a perversion of the concept in the form of an asserted collec-
tive responsibility, according to which a society or portion thereof can
properly be held to blame for actions taken without its knowledge and
consent and often even against its desires by a few of its members. In-
stitutionally, this approach manifests itself in the assumption that indi-
viduals and institutions are mutually exclusive categories, the former
ordinarily said to be subject to much higher moral standards than the
latter. Morality, as a consequence, is virtually banished from public
affairs, having been sent to preside over private matters of much
smaller import. More than that, institutional responsibility, like the ge-
nus collective responsibility of which it is a species, ignores the obvious
fact that societies or institutions do not act, but that only individuals
do.
"Responsibility," in any case, involves a relationship, ordinarily a
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hierarchical relationship between people. This, in turn, has given rise
to a widely held model of bureaucratic responsibility which is as sim-
plistic as it is simple: from the lowest functionary level, subordinates
are responsible to their superiors who are responsible to their superiors
who are responsible to the chief executive, who is, finally, responsible
to the people. Such a model overstates hierarchical control while un-
derstating high officials' abilities at self-protection, and posits an inter-
ested, knowledgeable, participatory citizenry which differs considerably
from reality.
Running through the entire consideration of "responsibility" is the
problem of determining who is responsible for what. Having others
determine the nature and extent of one's responsibility seems inade-
quate in the face of their ignorance and secondhand knowledge of
many factors of which only the individual in question can know. Yet
having oneself determine one's own responsibility presents an obvious
conflict of interest, and faulty memories and perceptions and lack of
differing and relevant perspectives pose informational problems, too.
The practical solution has been a compromise, in which both external
and internal means of determination are utilized. The former receives
more public attention and is commonly spoken of as more realistic, but
the latter, in the form of internalized norms of conduct, seems more
effective.
The history of "responsibility," ancient and modern, is that of a con-
cept ensnared in a thousand threads of facts and values. The tempta-
tion to apply the Alexandrian solution to this verbal Gordian Knot is
strong, but there is available no blade to cut it. And so we must begin
the process of disentanglement. The alternative is neglect.
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